The Case of Donald Keyser and Taiwan's National Security Bureau
Author: Stéphane Lefebvre
DOI: 10.1080/08850600701249832
Publication Frequency: 4 issues per year
Published in: International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Volume 20, Issue 3 September 2007 , pages 512 - 526
Introduction
After the United States extended diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China (PRC) and adopted its one-China policy, Congress enacted the U.S.-Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (Public Law 96-8), which authorizes the continuation of commercial, cultural, and other relations between the United States and Taiwan, but not diplomatic relations. The policy has stood the test of time. Twenty-eight years later, the United States still opposes Taiwan's independence and seeks to prevent the PRC or Taiwan from conquering the other, favoring a peaceful resolution to their conflict. But many U.S. officials reportedly consider the relationship with China to be far more important than the one with Taiwan, mainly because of the PRC's current and future place and political influence in the world.1 Yet, not every U.S. official privately shares this view, and knowing that would certainly be of concern to Taiwan, always interested in any shift in U.S. policy. This is the broad context within which the case of Donald Keyser unfolded between 2004 and 2006.
AN UNAUTHORIZED SIDE TRIP
On 15 September 2004, the U.S. government arrested, on the basis of a criminal complaint filed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Donald Willis Keyser, a reputed expert on China then serving as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs at the Department of State. The complaint revealed that Keyser, a fluent Mandarin speaker, had allegedly concealed a September 2003 visit to Taipei, Taiwan, by not listing it on a U.S. Customs Declaration form, and making a false statement about the trip on his security reinvestigation form in May 2004, a violation of Title 18 United States Code, Section 1001(a) (see Box 1) punishable by fine or imprisonment (up to five years and $250,000, respectively) or both. He was released that same day on a $500,000 bond, co-signed by his wife, Margaret Lyons,2 and required to surrender his passport and wear a monitoring bracelet. On 2 October Keyser's appearance before the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, during which he was supposed to be formally indicted, was cancelled and the indictment set for no later than 12 November as a result of a motion jointly filed by goverment prosecutors and Keyser's attorney. The motion had successfully argued that more time was needed by government prosecutors to review the documents and computer records obtained after the execution of a search warrant.3 Box 1 Title 18, United States Code, Part I, Chapter 47, §1001 §1001. Statement or Entries Generally
Source: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode18/usc_sec_18_00001001 - 000-.html
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully -
(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact;
(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or
(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry;
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.
(b) Subsection (a) does not apply to a party to a judicial proceeding, or that party's counsel, for statements, representations, writings or documents submitted by such party or counsel to a judge or magistrate in that proceeding.
(c) With respect to any matter within the jurisdiction of the legislative branch, subsection (a) shall apply only to -
(1) administrative matters, including a claim for payment, a matter related to the procurement of property or services, personnel or employment practices, or support services, or a document required by law, rule, or regulation to be submitted to the Congress or any office or officer within the legislative branch; or
(2) any investigation or review, conducted pursuant to the authority of any committee, subcommittee, commission or office of the Congress, consistent with applicable rules of the House or Senate.
Keyser had stopped in Taiwan while on an official tour to China and Japan. He had departed for China on 31 August 2003, and from there to Tokyo on 2 September. Before coming back to the United States on 7 September, Keyser stopped in Taipei for three days, arriving on the 3rd and departing for Tokyo on the 6th. During the stopover in Taipei, Keyser met with Chen Nien-tse (better known as Isabelle Cheng),4 a 33-year-old female junior officer of Taiwan's National Security Bureau (NSB) assigned to the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO) in Washington, D.C., who had traveled to Taipei via Los Angeles on 30 August 2003. Cheng apparently took Keyser sightseeing. To conceal his trip to Taiwan from the State Department, Keyser reported that the persons he had planned to meet in Japan were no longer available, and, rather than coming back to the United States immediately, he had decided to take three days of vacation time, from 3 September to 6 September, in Tokyo instead. Had Keyser sought permission to stop in Taiwan, his request would have been turned down by his superior, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James A. Kelly, as the United States did not have official diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Keyser's unauthorized trip to Taiwan was later confirmed through background credit checks which revealed he had used his credit card for purchases made in Taiwan, including $570.01 at a Christian Dior store.
WASHINGTON COMPANIONSHIP
Following his return to Washington from Taipei, Keyser was seen on several occasions with Cheng. At times, these ventures included the NSB's highest-ranking officer in Washington, Lieutenant General Huang Kuang-hsun (better known as Michael Huang).5 At many of these meetings, Keyser was observed giving or showing them different pieces of documentation. Keyser never reported his encounters with these two foreign officials to his superior or any of his colleagues. On 4 September 2004, only a few days after Keyser's resignation from the State Department, the FBI stopped the three of them coming out of a restaurent. Cheng agreed to be searched. The FBI recovered the six-page document that Keyser had given her during the lunch, which was titled "Discussion Topics-September 04, 2004," and later determined to be derived from material that was available to Keyser at the State Department. He admitted to FBI agents of having given the document to Cheng and Huang, and that he would often write talking points for his meetings with them, both of whom he knew to be NSB officers. He further acknowledged having met Cheng in Taipei and not having informed anyone about his visit there - a severe lack of judgment, as it could have possibly exposed Keyser to later blackmail by the NSB.6 Yet, neither the criminal complaint against Keyser nor the FBI affidavit supporting it made mention that Keyser had provided any classified information to the NSB or that he had accepted anything in return. The relationship between Keyser and Cheng, to the extent there could have been one, was not fully substantiated either. Cheng, a divorcee and political science graduate from National Taiwan University, had gone to New York by train with Keyser on 29 May 2004. Although considered a junior officer in the NSB, Cheng had served in the United Kingdom before her posting to the United States.7 Revealed later was the fact that Cheng was engaged to, and living with, a British journalist when she started meeting with Keyser.
MISHANDLED DOCUMENTS AND A PLEA BARGAIN
On 4 September, the day Keyser was apprehended, the FBI searched his residence in Fairfax Station, Virginia, where they found 3,659 hard copy and electronic documents classified Top Secret (28), Secret (1,976), and Confidential, dating from 1980 to 2004.
Keyser, whose current (and fourth) wife is a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer,8 had a diplomatic career spanning over thirty years, with stints overseas in Beijing and Tokyo (see Box 2). In Washington, he saw intelligence up close early on in his career and again in 1999-2000, when he served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, responsible for the Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). In 2000, however, he was suspended for thirty days and reassigned for lax security over the loss of a laptop computer containing highly classified information that involved five other State Department employees. His suspension led to the resignation in protest - in the form of early retirement - of his supervisor, INR Director J. Stapleton Roy. Roy, who served as a U.S. Ambassador to China, would later write a letter for the defense asking that Keyser be spared any jail time for his actions.9 Keyser resigned from his position on 30 July 2004, and subsequently entered a retirement course at the Foreign Service Institute. His retirement became effective two months later, on 30 September.10 Box 2 Keyser's Career Path Timeline
Event
Sources: Press Release, The White House, 16 April 1999; Jerry Markon, "Powell Aide Gave Papers to Taiwan, FBI Says," The Washington Post, 16 September, 2004, p. A1; Criminal Complaint, Case 1:04M803, United States District Court, Eastern Dictrict of Virginia, 15 September 2004.
1943 07 17
Born in Baltimore, Maryland
1965
B.A., Highest Honors, University of Maryland
1965-1966
Ph.D. studies
1968-1970
Stanford Inter-University Centre, Taiwan
1970-1972
Ph.D. studies (all requirements completed but the dissertation)
1972
Commissioned a Foreign Service Officer, Department of State
1973-1975
China analyst, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
1976-1978
U.S. Embassy, Beijing, China
1979-1981
U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, Japan
1981-1982
Special Advisor to Hawaii Governor Ariyoshi, State's Pearson Program
1982-1983
U.S. Embassy, Beijing, China
1983-1985
Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs
1985-1988
Chief of the Political/External Affairs Unit, U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, Japan
1988-1989
National War College, Class of 1989
1989-1992
Minister-Counselor, U.S. Embassy, Beijing, China
1992-1993
Chaired studies of Japanese policy issues, Washington, D.C.
1993-1998
Successively Director, Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs, Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs; Office Director, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs; Senior Inspector, Office of Inspector General
1998-1999
Special Negotiator for Nagorno-Karabakh and New Independent States Regional Conflicts
1999
Named by President Clinton for rank of Ambassador as Special Negotiator for Nagorno-Karabakh and New Independent States Regional Conflicts
1999-2000
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)
2000-2001
Office of the director general of the Foreign Service
2001-2003
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
2003-02
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
2004-09-30
Retired from the Senior Foreign Service
A former State Department and National Security officer, Jeff Bader, had only good words for Keyser's abilities and loyalty to the United States: "He is intellectually without peer. He knew more about the U.S.-China-Taiwan relationship and how to navigate it than anybody I know. I never heard a syllable out of him in 22 years that suggested anything other than absolute loyalty and patriotism to the United States. I can't accept the notion that he has done anything of the sort that's implied."11 Taiwanese media speculations asserted that Keyser might have had a sexual relationship with Cheng due to their frequent encounters.12 While sexual entanglements are not unusual in U.S. espionage cases,13 at the time of Keyser's arrest nothing seriously indicated that his case was one of espionage or that it had a sexual overtone.
On 12 December 2005, Keyser agreed to a plea agreement that would not prevent him from keeping his federal pension.14 At paragraph 5 of his plea, Keyser agreed to fully, truthfully, and completely cooperate with the government regarding any illegal or intelligence activities by himself or others, to submit to polygraph examinations, and to admit to the admissibility of the results of these examinations in any future proceeding about his compliance with the plea agreement.
He told the court he was deeply ashamed of his actions, admitting to a personal, but not to an explicit sexual relationship with Cheng, and pleaded guilty to having made two false statements (denying a relationship with Cheng which may have made him vulnerable to coercion, exploitation or pressure from a foreign government, and not reporting the trip to Taiwan, a violation of Title 18, U.S.C., Section 1001(a)) (see Box 1), and having removed, without authorization, classified documents from Department of State premises, a violation of Title 18, U.S.C., Section 2071(b) (see Box 3). He explained that he had not wanted his wife to discover his relationship with Cheng, known to him as a declared NSB officer, and recognized that his wish to keep his relationship with Cheng secret when it started in 2002 could have resulted in his being blackmailed. He added, though, that he had neither given any classified documents to Cheng for which Taiwan was not cleared to receive, nor been blackmailed by the NSB. Box 3 Title 18, United States Code, Part I, Chapter 101, §2071 §2071. Concealment, Removal, or Mutilation Generally
Source: http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode18/usc_sec_18_00002071 - 000-.html
(a) Whoever willfully and unlawfully conceals, removes, mutilates, obliterates, or destroys, or attempts to do so, or, with intent to do so takes and carries away any record, proceeding, map, book, paper, document, or other thing, filed or deposited with any clerk or officer of any court of the United States, or in any public office, or with any judicial or public officer of the United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
Box 4 The NSB
• Established on 1 March 1955, it is a subsidiary organ of the National Security Council responsible with the overall management and coordination of all security and intelligence activities, the planning and execution of special missions, and the analysis of of national strategic intelligence
• It acknowledges operating defensively and offensively at home and abroad, using both human and technical intelligence means under strict cover
• The Director General and his three Directors General lead and manage six operational departments (International; Chinese mainland; operations in the Taiwan region; analysis; security of scientific and technological intelligence and communications; and development and control of codes and related equipment), a Computer Center, a Secretariat, a General Affairs Office, a Personnel Department, an Accounting Department, a Department of Government and Ethics, a Telecommunications Technology Center, a Training Center, and a Special Service Command Center
• By law, the NSB budget must remain confidential and its staff apolitical. However, the NSB must submit an annual report to parliament that summarizes its operations
Keyser's CIA wife, Margaret Lyons, who had known about her husband's home collection of classified documents for about a year, did not have her security clearance revoked by the Agency. On 22 February 2006, she wrote a letter to the presiding judge in Keyser's case in which she conceded her failure to properly secure the classified documents in her husband's possession, as well as an unknown number of CIA documents she herself was keeping at home without authorization.15
EVASIVE DEBRIEFINGS
After Keyser's plea agreement was finalized and accepted by the court, the FBI and other government officials debriefed him four times over a three-month period (January-March 2006), and asked him to submit to two polygraph examinations - on 14 February and 5 April 2006. The debriefings were not satisfactory. According to government prosecutors, Keyser was not very cooperative, even evasive, and tried to conceal many of the facts surrounding his intelligence and sexual relationships with Cheng, his activities while visiting Taiwan, his stack of classified documents at home, and his taking a laptop computer and classified material while visiting China, Japan, and Taiwan in 2003. During his 18 January 2006 debriefing, he justified his meetings with Cheng and her boss, Huang, as a way to better convey U.S. policy to Taiwan. He denied helping Cheng in her intelligence duties, despite responding promptly to her requests for information, giving her documents, and sending her many e-mails about official U.S. government business - some of which Cheng forwarded as part of "Secret" cables to the NSB's headquarters - asking her not to attribute to him the origin of any information he passed along, and acknowledging in e-mails that what he was doing would make her indispensable to her agency. Cheng gave copies of these cables to U.S. authorities on 4 September 2004. These cables indicate clearly that Cheng considered Keyser an intelligence asset of value to the NSB, one whose identity had to be protected from disclosure.16
During his first and second debriefings, Keyser was asked about an e-mail he had sent to Cheng in which he identified a former State Department official as a possible NSB recruiting target. In Keyser's words, this person was
ripe for recruitment by careful, methodical, serious intelligence agencies. In the days of the Cold War, Soviet and East German intelligence officers were quite practiced at identifying people like this, people who did not wake up one day and say "I want to be a traitor" but people whose relatively minor weaknesses and ego gratification needs make them potential targets.17
This official was identified by the defense as a Heritage Foundation analyst, John Tkacik, who once headed the INR's China section. Keyser's defense counsel, Robert Litt, said that Keyser's e-mail was simply a way to discredit Tkacik's criticism of the U.S. envoy in Taiwan. Clearly upset by Kaiser's comments, Tkacik was firm in saying he had never been the subject of a recruitment effort by an intelligence service, including Taiwan's.18
When debriefed about his trip to Taiwan in September 2003, Keyser denied meeting with anyone else but Cheng or giving any classified information to the NSB. Polygraphed on these two matters, he twice failed the examination as deception was found. E-mails between Keyser and Cheng also indicate that, during his debriefing sessions, he "had made false and misleading statements about the timing of his decision to go to Taiwan."19 He also denied being conscious of covering his tracks when meeting with Cheng, although his actions, observed by an FBI surveillance team or otherwise discovered during the investigation, allegedly were akin to counterintelligence tradecraft. Forensic evidence from his laptop indicates that Keyser had used it in China to access eight classified files from floppy disks, and that he again used the laptop while in Taiwan. When debriefed on this matter, he denied having used a laptop in China or brought classified information with him on his travels.
For all these reasons, on 29 June 2006 prosecutors motioned the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia to find Keyser in material breach of his plea agreement. One of the prosecutors told the press that the action was necessary because Keyser had not respected his part of the deal, and that his case was now espionage-related. Sentencing was therefore postponed until a decision on the motion was taken, and an evidentiary hearing held in camera to decide whether the new classified information could lead to new charges or bolster the government's case at sentencing.20
The next day, the court agreed to the government's motion to use classified information to argue that Keyser was in breach of his plea agreement, and to deny Keyser access to that information. But the judge allowed a summary of the classified information to be provided to Keyser's counsels, Robert Litt and Mara Senn. They responded two weeks later with a motion of reconsideration because, in their opinion, not permitting them and Keyser the opportunity "to review the full underlying information would violate Mr. Keyser's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights and is inconsistent with the provisions of CIPA [Classified Information Procedures Act]."21 In the memorandum supporting their motion, the lawyers also disputed the most recent claims of the government prosecutors. They asserted that Keyser's actions were in support of U.S. foreign policy (even though the information he gave Cheng was in response to her specific questions); that he had not given her classified information; and that no harm resulted from his relationship with her.22 On 5 July, the federal prosecutors had filed a 43-page memorandum in support of their motion, alleging that Keyser had violated his plea agreement by not fully assisting the government's damage assessment related to his actions, and for not having fully disclosed his exact relationship with Cheng - which allegedly included sexual activities, including twice in a parked vehicle. The filing further alleged that Keyser was infatuated with Cheng, and that some of his actions when meeting with her were tantamount to espionage tradecraft. As for Cheng, she had married the journalist from The China Post, Christopher Cockel, while meeting and allegedly having sex with Keyser, thus suggesting that her motives might not have been innocent.
On 13 December 2006, prosecutors dropped their request to bring additional charges against Keyser, thus putting an end to court proceedings until Keyser's sentencing, set for 22 January 2007. In their court filing, they mentioned that Keyser had been debriefed again the preceding day, but revealed no details.23
TAIWAN'S REACTIONS
In the days following Keyser's indictment, the NSB reportedly recalled home several intelligence officers from the United States, but not Cheng and Huang, who were said to be cooperating with U.S. investigators. It issued a press release stating that Taiwan and the United States were on very friendly terms, and that the NSB's mission in the United States was to understand the positions of the United States vis-à-vis Taiwan through legal means rather than undercover operations. David Lee, Taiwan's representative in Washington, D.C., often repeated this message in his dealings with U.S. officials. Notwithstanding, a senior Taiwanese official suggested at the time of Keyser's arrest that his country's intelligence personnel and their activities in the United States would be reviewed and readjusted in light of the charges against Keyser.24 Because the case surfaced at a time when the NSB was concerned about internal leaks, the media quickly surmised, with the help of unnamed inside sources, that the U.S.'s detailed knowledge of Keyser's visit to Taipei could have been the result of further leaks, or even a penetration of the NSB by the United States.25
Taiwan's Premier Yu Shyi-kun and Foreign Minister Mark Chen were very clear in their respective statements to Parliament and the media that Washington-based NSB officers had not done anything illegal and that their government would cooperate with the United States in getting to the bottom of the affair. Chen also directly communicated this message to U.S. officials during a late September 2004 stopover in Baltimore, where he was hosting a conference.26
Michael Huang was replaced ten months later by a newly appointed NSB deputy director and former president of the Chinese Military Academy, Lieutenant General Yang Kuo-Chiang, a high-ranking official without intelligence experience, to signal to the U.S. how important Taiwan values their bilateral relationship.27 Yang was indeed an appropriate choice; he had lived and studied in the U.S. and already had numerous government contacts. His lack of intelligence experience would also signal that he was not coming over to satisfy any NSB operational requirements. Upon returning to Taipei, Huang briefly took over a deputy director position before retiring by year's end. As for Isabelle Cheng, she returned to Taipei some time in 2005.28
After the U.S. government alleged that Keyser had not respected his plea agreement, Taiwan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs reacted cautiously, noting it would be following the development of the case and assess its impact once it was finally dealt with. In the meantime, bilateral ties between Taiwan and the United States had not reportedly been affected and were continuing normally.29 But this continuity did not last very long. In August, TECRO motioned the courts for a return of the documents that Cheng had provided the FBI after Keyser was detained in 2004, and that no use be made of them by the U.S. authorities. But TECRO's request that its motion be treated as secret was rejected, thus exposing the policy change on its cooperation with U.S. authorities on the Keyser case.30 The U.S. Justice Department opposed TECRO's motion, agreeing only to give TECRO copies of the original documents, because these could be used as evidence in a criminal trial.31 The matter became moot as a result of the December 2006 decision by prosecutors not to proceed to criminal trial on espionage charges.
On Monday, 22 January 2007, Federal Judge Thomas Ellis of Alexandria, Virginia, sentenced Keyser to one year and one day in jail, two years of supervised release, and payment of a fine of $25,000 on charges of having kept thousands of classified documents at his home and for lying about his relationship with Cheng. In a written statement, Chuck Rosenberg, the U.S. Attorney overseeing the case, claimed that Keyser "had an absolute obligation to safeguard the classified information entrusted to him and utterly failed to do so. His sentence of imprisonment is a warning to others in positions of public trust."32
WHY WOULD TAIWAN NEED TO SPY ON THE UNITED STATES?
The Taiwan Relations Act commits the United States to assist Taiwan with the provision of articles and services "as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability." U.S. officials from time to time reiterate the point that this is not an open-ended commitment to defend Taiwan if it were attacked. In fact, Taiwan has the responsibility to reach an acceptable level of self-defense capability before receiving U.S. assistance to maintain that level. In September 2005, Department of Defense official Edward Ross, Principal Director, Operations Directorate, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, warned Taiwan before the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council that "We cannot help defend you, if you cannot defend yourself."33
As J. Peter Scoblic, the executive editor of The New Republic magazine, has noted, Taiwan does not particularly trust the United States. According to Scoblic,
The problem is that, while ostensibly committed to the island's defense, the United States is also clearly committed to improving relations with China. When the United States steps too close to the mainland - as when [President George] Bush told Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao last December [2003] that he opposed Taiwanese moves toward formal independence - Taipei gets anxious. So Taiwan might very well spy on us to learn how far toward independence it could go without loosing U.S. support and at what point it could expect help from Washington, should Beijing become aggressive.34
An editorial in the Taipei Times makes a similar argument:
We do not know if Keyser was in fact spying for Taiwan. But we can say that it is hard to blame Taiwan if he was. When the staff of the foreign ministry of the world's hyperpower [the State Department] is virtually unanimous in its opposition to your interests, it is certainly useful to know exactly who is saying what to whom.35
Taiwan's Law for National Intelligence Operations specifies at Article 7 that the intelligence collected, analyzed, and used by Taiwan's intelligence organizations falls into three categories: (1) mainland or foreign information that involves national security or interests; (2) information concerning civil strife, treason, leakage of national secrets, foreign spies, enemy spies, transnational crimes, and infiltration and sabotage activities by external and internal terrorists; and (3) other information concerning the overall national situation, national defense, foreign affairs, cross-strait relations, economy, science and technology, social situations, or major public offenses. This intelligence is gathered in a variety of ways, including an engagement "in aggressive intelligence-gathering within the United States."36
Taiwan's ability to defend itself in case of an attack by the PRC is far from certain, and is dependent to a large extent on U.S. assistance, which Taiwanese often doubt because of the importance the U.S. accords to its relationship with the PRC. Having key national interests at stake, the NSB would, not surprisingly, attempt to supplement any information received by Taiwan through official diplomatic channels with their own. In Keyser's case, it seems clear that he was being exploited by Isabelle Cheng for her own benefit and that of the NSB. But the NSB's Headquarters in Taipei does not seem to have been overly proactive in directing Cheng in her relationship with Keyser. Otherwise, Cheng would not have noted repeatedly in her messages back to HQ that they had to protect her source (Keyser). Strangely, she did not even use a codename or a file number to refer to him in these messages.
THE DANGER OF FRIENDLY RELATIONSHIPS
The Donald Keyser case has once again highlighted the fact that the control, handling, and storage of classified information at both the State Department and the CIA are in need of closer monitoring and review. Keyser and his wife, Margaret Lyons, were the recipients of highly classified documents, and obviously have not been made to fully account for their ultimate disposition. Keyser accumulated such documents over a very long period, while gaining in professional rank and responsibility. Due to their long experience in government and within the Intelligence Community, no satisfactory excuse for their behavior exists. The question is: How many other State officials routinely bring home classified documents without proper approval and filling the necessary paperwork? Perhaps spot checks of briefcases when State Department employees leave the premises would deter other officials from "pulling a Keyser."
The case also illustrates the validity of policies concerning the reporting of unofficial or opportune contacts with foreign officials, or personal relationships with foreign citizens, for U.S. government officials enjoying access to classified information. Keyser was obviously aware of these policies, but purposefully chose to ignore them and conceal his behavior. Had he followed the rules applying to him from the very beginning, he might not be in jail today.
The presence of NSB officers Cheng and Huang in the United States had been declared to U.S. authorities, and was part and parcel of the "unofficial" relationship between the United States and Taiwan. The posting of declared intelligence officers between friendly countries is routine, and brings with it the expectation that they not engage in covert intelligence-gathering operations without the consent of the host country. Judging from what is known, Donald Keyser seems to have been a target of opportunity who presented himself vulnerably due to his infatuation with Cheng. Or did Isabelle Cheng purposefully target him after spotting his fondness for her? The truth may never be known.
REFERENCES
1. - U.S. Department of State Press Statement 2006/104, "Taiwan-U.S. Policy," Washington, D.C., 30 January 2006; David Momphard, "Taiwan's Fickle Friend," Taipei Times, 10 October 2004, p. 17
2. http://www.asiasociety.org/visit/washingtondc/AsiaSoc2002.pdf — According to the appearance bond, both live at the same address in Fairfax Station, Virginia. In 2002, 2003, and 2004, Keyser and Lyons jointly donated between $100–$149 to the Asia Society according to the organization's Annual Report 2002, http//www.asiasociety.org/visit/washingtondc/AsiaSoc2002.pdf, Annual Report 2003, http://asiasociety.com/visit/washingtondc/2003annrpt.pdf, and Annual Report 2004, http://www.asiasociety.org/visit/washingtondc/2004annrpt.pdf
3. Snyder, Charles (2004) Charges on Keyser are Postponed. Taipei Times p. 3.
4. (2004) Mystery Taiwan Woman in US Spy Storm Named. Straits Times — Her identity was revealed in Lawrence Chung
5. — His identity was revealed in Lawrence Chung, “Mystery Taiwan Woman in US Spy Storm Named.”
6. Calabresi, Massimo (2004) Error of Judgment. http://www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/article/0,13673,501040927-699471,00.html Time Asia — accessed at http://www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/article/0,13673,501040927-699471,00.html [pubmed]
7. Chung, Lawrence — Mystery Taiwan Woman in US Spy Storm Named.
8. Morello, Carol (2004) Arrest Shocks Former State Department Colleagues. The Washington Post p. A8.
9. Gertz, Bill and Scarborough, Rowan (2000) Inside the Ring. http://www.computerworld.com The Washington Times — Jerry Markon, “Powell Aide Gave Papers to Taiwan, FBI Says,” The Washington Post, 16 September 2004, p. A1; Sean Paige, “Waste & Abuse,” Insight Magazine, January 2001, accessed at http//www.insightmag.com; Dan Verton, “State Department to Punish 6 Over Missing Laptop,” Computer World, 6 December 2000, accessed at http://www.computerworld.com; Josh Gerstein, “Heritage Foundation Official Fingered as Possible Spy Recruit,” The Washington Times, 14 August 2006
10. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps — “Employment Status of Donald W. Keyser,” Taken Question 2005/1162 (Question Taken at 12 December 2005 Daily Press Briefing), Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, 12 December 2005, accessed at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps on 12 December 2005
11. Morello, Carol — Arrest Shocks Former State Department Colleagues
12. Chung, Lawrence (2004) US ‘May Be Using Spy Scandal As Warning,’. Strait Times
13. (2005) Sex Again: The Smith-Leung Spy Case. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 18:2 , pp. 296-304. - See, inter alia, Stéphane Lefebvre [informaworld]
14. Seper, Jerry (2005) Ex-aide Pleads Guilty at State. The Washington Times — Josh Meyer, “Ex-Official Admits Wrongdoing, Not Espionage,” The Los Angeles Times, 13 December 2005; Charles Snyder, “Keyser Offers Guilty Plea to US Court,” Taipei Times, 14 December 2005, p. 1
15. Burger, Timothy J. and Zagorin, Adam A Steamy Spy Scandal at the State Department. http://www.time.com Time Magazine — posted on 15 July 2006 at http://www.time.com
16. pp. 13–18. — Memorandum in Support of Motion to Find Defendant in Material Breach of Plea Agreement and to Release the Government from Its Plea Obligations, Crim. No. 1:05CR543, Alexandria, United States District Court for Eastern District of Virgina, filed on 5 July 2006
17. p. 19. — Memorandum in Support of Motion to Find Defendant in Material Breach of Plea Agreement and to Release the Government from Its Plea Obligations
18. Gerstein, Josh (2006) Heritage Foundation Official Fingered as Possible Spy Recruit. The Washington Times
19. pp. 24–25. — Memorandum in Support of Motion to Find Defendant in Material Breach of Plea Agreement and to Release the Government from Its Plea Obligations
20. Barakat, Matthew p. 1. — “U.S. Prosecutors Seek Withdrawal from Plea Deal with Diplomat,” Associated Press, 26 June 2006, accessed at http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/detail.asp?ID=84745&GRP=B on 26 June 2006; Charles Snyder, “Keyser to Face Spy Charges, US Prosecutors Say,” Taipei Times, 25 June 2006
21. — Motion for Reconsideration of Order Approving Substitution Under Section 4 of the Classified Information Procedures Act, Crim. No. 1:05cr543, Alexandria, United States District Court for Eastern District of Virginia, 14 July 2006
22. Gerstein, Josh (2006) Official at Center of Taiwanese Spying Probe Cries Foul. The New York Sun [crossref]
23. Gerstein, Josh (2006) U.S. Drops Plans for More Charges In Taiwan Spy Case. The New York Sun [crossref]
24. Chieh-yu, Lin (2004) Officials Pull Spy Team from US. Taipei Times p. 3. — “Taiwan Won't Recall Intelligence Agents,” Associated Press, 20 September 2004; Chris Cockel, “Intelligence Officers Urge Understanding,” China Post, 14 October 2004
25. Chieh-yu, Lin (2004) NSB Expects Probe over Diplomat Flap. Taipei Times p. 1.
26. Chen, Melody (2004) Visit Unrelated to Keyser Flap: Chen. Taipei Times p. 1. — Reuters, “Taiwan Says Security Officers Did Not Hurt U.S. Ties,” 27 September 2004
27. Ming-chieh, Wu (2005) Chung-Kuo Shih Pao
28. Ming-chieh, Wu (2005) Truth of Keyser Case Comes Out. Chung-Kuo Shih-Pao — Wu Ming-Chieh, “Repairing Damage from Keyser Case, Reestablishing Mutual Trust,” Chung-Kuo Shih-Pao, 25 July 2005
29. (2006) MOFA Hopes Keyser Case Won't Harm Washington Ties. http//english.www.gov.tw Taiwan Headlines — accessed at http//english.www.gov.tw on July 19, 2006
30. Gerstein, Josh (2006) In a Reversal, Taiwan Officials Seek to Block U.S. Spy Investigation. The Washington Times
31. Gerstein, Josh (2006) Justice Dept. Aims To Block Taiwan Spy Probe. The New York Sun [crossref]
32. Gerstein, Josh (2007) Jail Sentence For Diplomat In Spy Case. The New York Sun p. 1.
33. Ross, Edward (2005) Remarks before the U.S.–Taiwan Business Council-Defense Industry Conference 2005 p. 5. — see also, Simon Tisdall, “US goes on attack over Taiwan's defence,” Guardian Weekly, 28 October–3 November 2005, p. 5
34. Scoblic, J. Peter (2004) When Allies Steal Secrets. The Los Angeles Times
35. (2004) U.S.: Know Where Your Interests Lie. Taipei Times p. 8. — Editorial
36. p. 13. — Memorandum in Support of Motion to Find Defendant in Material Breach of Plea Agreement and to Release the Government from Its Plea Obligations
List of Tables
Box 1 Title 18, United States Code, Part I, Chapter 47, §1001 §1001. Statement or Entries Generally
Source: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode18/usc_sec_18_00001001 - 000-.html
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully -
(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact;
(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or
(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry;
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.
(b) Subsection (a) does not apply to a party to a judicial proceeding, or that party's counsel, for statements, representations, writings or documents submitted by such party or counsel to a judge or magistrate in that proceeding.
(c) With respect to any matter within the jurisdiction of the legislative branch, subsection (a) shall apply only to -
(1) administrative matters, including a claim for payment, a matter related to the procurement of property or services, personnel or employment practices, or support services, or a document required by law, rule, or regulation to be submitted to the Congress or any office or officer within the legislative branch; or
(2) any investigation or review, conducted pursuant to the authority of any committee, subcommittee, commission or office of the Congress, consistent with applicable rules of the House or Senate.
Box 2 Keyser's Career Path Timeline
Event
Sources: Press Release, The White House, 16 April 1999; Jerry Markon, "Powell Aide Gave Papers to Taiwan, FBI Says," The Washington Post, 16 September, 2004, p. A1; Criminal Complaint, Case 1:04M803, United States District Court, Eastern Dictrict of Virginia, 15 September 2004.
1943 07 17
Born in Baltimore, Maryland
1965
B.A., Highest Honors, University of Maryland
1965-1966
Ph.D. studies
1968-1970
Stanford Inter-University Centre, Taiwan
1970-1972
Ph.D. studies (all requirements completed but the dissertation)
1972
Commissioned a Foreign Service Officer, Department of State
1973-1975
China analyst, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
1976-1978
U.S. Embassy, Beijing, China
1979-1981
U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, Japan
1981-1982
Special Advisor to Hawaii Governor Ariyoshi, State's Pearson Program
1982-1983
U.S. Embassy, Beijing, China
1983-1985
Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs
1985-1988
Chief of the Political/External Affairs Unit, U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, Japan
1988-1989
National War College, Class of 1989
1989-1992
Minister-Counselor, U.S. Embassy, Beijing, China
1992-1993
Chaired studies of Japanese policy issues, Washington, D.C.
1993-1998
Successively Director, Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs, Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs; Office Director, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs; Senior Inspector, Office of Inspector General
1998-1999
Special Negotiator for Nagorno-Karabakh and New Independent States Regional Conflicts
1999
Named by President Clinton for rank of Ambassador as Special Negotiator for Nagorno-Karabakh and New Independent States Regional Conflicts
1999-2000
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)
2000-2001
Office of the director general of the Foreign Service
2001-2003
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
2003-02
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
2004-09-30
Retired from the Senior Foreign Service
Box 3 Title 18, United States Code, Part I, Chapter 101, §2071 §2071. Concealment, Removal, or Mutilation Generally
Source: http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode18/usc_sec_18_00002071 - 000-.html
(a) Whoever willfully and unlawfully conceals, removes, mutilates, obliterates, or destroys, or attempts to do so, or, with intent to do so takes and carries away any record, proceeding, map, book, paper, document, or other thing, filed or deposited with any clerk or officer of any court of the United States, or in any public office, or with any judicial or public officer of the United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
Box 4 The NSB
• Established on 1 March 1955, it is a subsidiary organ of the National Security Council responsible with the overall management and coordination of all security and intelligence activities, the planning and execution of special missions, and the analysis of of national strategic intelligence
• It acknowledges operating defensively and offensively at home and abroad, using both human and technical intelligence means under strict cover
• The Director General and his three Directors General lead and manage six operational departments (International; Chinese mainland; operations in the Taiwan region; analysis; security of scientific and technological intelligence and communications; and development and control of codes and related equipment), a Computer Center, a Secretariat, a General Affairs Office, a Personnel Department, an Accounting Department, a Department of Government and Ethics, a Telecommunications Technology Center, a Training Center, and a Special Service Command Center
• By law, the NSB budget must remain confidential and its staff apolitical. However, the NSB must submit an annual report to parliament that summarizes its operations
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