What Does South Korea Want?

What Does South Korea Want?
By Jongryn Mo

Less U.S., more self-reliance.

The north korean nuclear crisis entered a new phase when Pyongyang detonated a nuclear device on October 9, 2006. The response of the international community to the North Korean test was swift and stern. The five other countries participating in the North Korean Six-Party talks condemned North Korea immediately after the test, and the un Security Council passed a resolution imposing new sanctions on the North five days later.

International reactions grew more diverse over time, however. The North Korean nuclear test added new urgency to a peaceful settlement of the crisis and spurred a flurry of diplomatic activity aimed at solving it through the Six-Party talks. Some would argue that this greater interest in diplomacy was responsible for the February 2007 accord in Beijing on the initial steps toward North Korea’s nuclear disarmament.

But whether or not the nuclear test will change the basic configuration of national interests and policies on the North Korea security threat remains to be seen. Even in the aftermath of the provocation, three members of the Six- Party talks, South Korea, China, and Russia, have expressed clear reservations about drastic change in North Korea policy and emphasized the importance of diplomacy and dialogue in resolving the nuclear crisis. South Korea, in particular, has been reluctant to revise its engagement policy toward the North. Nor do the recent Six-Party talk agreements mean that Washington and Tokyo have given up their hard-line policies toward Pyongyang. Distrust of the North Koreans runs deep in Washington, and American negotiators went out of their way during the February 2007 talks to emphasize the tentative nature of the Beijing agreement.

In particular, the disagreement between South Korea and the United States is likely to persist even as they work together for the successful completion of the Six-Party talks. The current discord between the two allies goes back to the early 2000s, when the new Bush administration adopted a hard-line approach toward the North, and Seoul chose to adhere to the policy of engagement with Pyongyang that began in 1997 with the election of Kim Dae Jung as president. When Roh Moo-hyun succeeded Kim in 2002 and continued with the pro-engagement approach, it became apparent that South Korean assertiveness was here to stay.

Given the importance of the engagement policy to the identity and legacy of the current South Korean government, it is highly unlikely that it will be aggressive in supporting the un sanctions and other U.S.-led hard-line initiatives. If the past nine years of South Korean policy are any indication, it will likely take a change of government in Seoul to see a fundamental transformation in South Korea’s policy toward the North. No wonder that the upcoming presidential election in December 2007 is attracting so much attention.1

Many believe that if the conservative Grand National Party (gnp) wins after a decade in opposition, it will return to the pre-1997 hard-line policy. Likewise, it is said that another victory by the ruling Uri party will lead to the continuation of the pro-engagement policy. But I argue that these expectations are merely assumptions. There is no guarantee that a new gnp government will adopt a stand that is drastically different from that of the current administration. Neither can we assume that the next Uri government will automatically inherit Roh’s security policy. Rather, it seems more likely that the next government’s security policy will be determined not only by the party that captures power, but also by the nature of the factions that gain control of party policies.

In my view, there are at least four schools of thought that may determine the security policy of the next government. This essay will first explore the differences and commonalities among the four schools, before discussing which school is more likely to ensure long-term security for the country. I will then examine the political approaches that proponents will have to undertake in order to shape South Korea’s post-Roh security policy.

Left and right

Since Kim Dae Jung became president in 1997 and adopted the policy of engagement toward Pyongyang known as the sunshine policy, the left and the right have repeatedly clashed over issues ranging from North Korea’s nuclear policy to the U.S.-Korean military alliance and regional security. 2 In South Korean politics, the left is represented by the past two governments of Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo-hyun, while the right by the opposition Grand National Party. Although the left-right distinction is useful for describing the main cleavage in the South Korean foreign policy establishment, it obscures significant differences among various factions within each group. Therefore, new terms are needed in identifying major security orientations.

We can start differentiating groups by identifying key policy issues. The two main issues that divide policymakers and experts in South Korea are first, how best to exercise power toward the North, and second, where, between South Korea and the United States, to place responsibility for dealing with North Korea.

On exercising power toward the North, there are two positions — engagement and coercion. Those who want to engage North Korea are liberal because they believe that North Koreans are not inherently aggressive and that sustained engagement can modify Pyongyang’s behavior. Opponents of the engagement approach, doubtful that Pyongyang would be satisfied with the benefits of cooperation, present a classically realist argument. They believe that North Koreans are belligerent and that such hostility can only be deterred by the full display of power involving both rewards and punishments. Certainly, this debate between liberals and realists over how to view North Korea is hardly unique to South Korea. The debate is also a contentious one within the United States between doves and hawks. But the South Korean division on the second issue — which country should be responsible for exercising diplomatic leadership toward North Korea — is less universalistic and has largely been shaped by the country’s history.

Pan-Korean nationalists believe that Seoul should assume primary responsibility. Another group, known as the pro-Americans, believes that the responsibility should fall squarely on the shoulders of Washington, given the U.S.-South Korean military alliance. The pro-Americans have no qualms about South Korea’s taking a backseat when it comes to negotiating with or defending the South against the threat from the North. Yet another group, the multilateralists, takes a more nuanced position. While recognizing the importance of the U.S.-South Korea alliance, their emphasis is on maintaining an equal relationship. They are also more open to the idea of allowing China and other countries to participate in the diplomatic process to resolve the North Korean issue.

So, depending on one’s position on the two issues, there can be six possible perspectives on South Korean security policy (see Table i). Among them, I have identified liberal nationalism, liberal multilateralism, realist nationalism, and realist pro-Americanism as the four leading contenders.3

Table I

Primary policy features (and leading advocates) of various security policy orientations in South Korea

leadership/
approach
liberal
realist

Nationalist South Korea leads a policy of engagement against the North.
(Kim Dae Jung) South Korea leads international pressure on the North to disarm, and takes over responsibility for its own defense
(Park Chung Hee)

Pro-American South Korea relies on the United States to engage the North The United States is responsible for coercing and deterring North Korea
(Grand National Party)

Multi-Lateralist South Korea works with the United States and China as equal partners in engaging the North
(Roh Moo-hyun) South Korea works with the United States and China in coercing the North

If we attempt to fit the left and right into this framework, I would say that the classic leftist thinking in South Korea falls into the category of liberal nationalism. Liberal nationalists believe that the two Koreas should determine the destiny of the Korean peninsula, and that inter-Korean cooperation (minjok kongjo) is the primary means for achieving security on the peninsula. Seoul must negotiate directly with Pyongyang in order to modify North Korea’s behavior. Thus, it is not surprising that after the October 9 nuclear test, many liberal nationalists, led by former president Kim Dae Jung, asked Roh Moo-hyun to meet and negotiate directly with North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il.

The rise of liberal nationalism has been gradual yet perceptible. It first began to make inroads into the foreign policy establishment under the Kim Dae Jung government. And although it was not immediately apparent at that time, Kim’s sunshine policy was a quintessential liberal nationalist policy. While it is true that Kim did not call into question the legitimacy and importance of the U.S.-South Korean military alliance, it is worth bearing in mind that he did not have to do so, as the sunshine policy was not incompatible with the policy of engagement then being pursued by the Clinton administration. The nationalistic element of Kim’s liberal nationalism would certainly have become much more discernible if the former president had had to work with a more conservative U.S. administration.

The mainstream rightist position, on the other hand, is realist pro-Americanism. Realist pro-Americans not only distrust North Korea but also are skeptical about the utility of engagement. They scoff at what they perceive as unreciprocated engagement, and prefer either benign neglect or a mild regime of sanctions toward the North. But unlike their American counterparts, South Korean realists would not go as far as to support severe sanctions (such as blockades) or the use of force against Pyongyang.4 In line with their realist tendencies, realist pro-Americans accept a primary role for the United States in defending South Korea, as well as for taming the North’s nuclear ambitions. They also do not see anything wrong with allowing direct negotiations between the U.S. and the North, which was what happened during the first North Korean nuclear crisis of 1993–94. Given the current threat faced by South Korea, realist pro-Americanism types believe they have no choice but to rely on American military protection. Hence, they do not see any point in strengthening the country’s military capabilities. They also feel that there is little that Seoul can add to the arsenal of U.S. military power. Overall, then, it would not be far wrong to say that realist pro-Americans have adopted an almost pacifist attitude toward the country’s military capabilities.

This pacifist view seems to be shared by — indeed, it seems to be the guiding principle of — the Grand National Party and the conservative media. Both have fought hard to maintain the U.S.-South Korean military alliance, and have generally exhibited little enthusiasm for increasing the country’s defense expenditures. The proportion of gdp allocated to defense has been continuously declining since the early 1980s, from a high of 5.8 percent in 1980 to 2.4 percent in 2004. This defense cutback preceded the last two progressive administrations, beginning way back when the conservative parties were still in power.

The conservative media, too, have adopted the hues of pacifism. They have hardly taken issue with the gradual disarmament of South Korea and still argue against the recent controversy surrounding the transfer of wartime command of troops to the South Korean military on the grounds that doing so would increase Seoul’s defense burden.

A liberal multilateralist

Although liberal nationalism and realist pro-Americanism represent the two pillars of the South Korean foreign policy establishment, they are not the only influential ones. In fact, neither school characterizes the current policy of the Roh Moo-hyun government.

For many observers, there seems to be little difference between Roh Moo-hyun and Kim Dae Jung, with the former having inherited the latter’s sunshine policy. Moreover, like his predecessor, Roh also seems to believe that engagement is the only viable policy when it comes to dealing with an isolated and increasingly vulnerable North Korea.

But beyond the surface similarities, there are two important differences between Roh and Kim. First, Roh does not place as much importance on inter-Korean relations as Kim did, and it is clear that he is in no hurry to meet top North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il. Kim Dae Jung had no qualms about making illegal payments to North Korea in order to consummate their 2002 inter-Korean summit meeting. In contrast, Roh has clearly indicated that a second summit would be held only after the North Korean nuclear issue has been resolved.5

Second, Roh is more aggressive when it comes to defining a new, independent role for South Korea within Northeast Asia.6 His government has sought to move the center stage of Korean diplomacy to Northeast Asia, and away from U.S.-Korean bilateral relations. Given the rise of China, the increasing rivalry between China and Japan, and an uneasy U.S.-China relationship, it is perhaps unsurprising that Roh has sought to redefine South Korea’s role in the Northeast Asian region. Instead of relying exclusively on the United States, Roh believes that South Korea should work with her neighbors to manage constructively the shifting balances of power, and to help ensure regional peace and prosperity.

So Roh’s policy is neither liberal nationalism nor realist pro-Americanism. Rather, it is liberal multilateralism. Roh is liberal in so far as he continues to support the engagement policy toward North Korea. But he is not a (pan-Korean) nationalist, as he seeks active reliance on international cooperation — rather than on inter-Korean cooperation — in resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis. Multilateralism also describes Roh insofar as he favors more independence from the U.S., believing that such a form of independence will allow Seoul to take on the role of a true balancer or mediator within Northeast Asia. Indeed, playing the role of balancer means that South Korea needs to effectively maintain an arm’s-length attitude with all major powers in the region.

This multilateralist approach adopted by Roh has basically resulted in a dual-track policy — a mixture of independence and cooperation — toward the United States. The independence comes in the form of Roh’s disagreement with the U.S. over North Korea, where his determination in maintaining an engagement policy has conflicted with Washington’s equally staunch determination to pursue a hard-line policy. While the Bush administration believes that coordinated pressure on North Korea is the only workable option, the Roh government is adamantly opposed to any form of coercion or punishment. In fact, it can be argued that this desire for more independence has been the impetus for his pushing for the transfer of Korea’s wartime command from Washington to Seoul.

While Roh has sought to be more independent of the United States over North Korea, he has also cooperated with and strengthened the U.S.-Korean alliance. Despite domestic opposition and misgivings, Roh dispatched a large number of Korean ground troops to Iraq in 2004. At Washington’s request, Seoul agreed in January 2006 that U.S. troops in South Korea could be deployed for operations outside of the Korean peninsula — a move that no doubt enhanced the strategic flexibility of the U.S. military. Yet another example of a closer U.S.-Korean cooperation came in the form of the November 2005 apec summit declaration, in which the two leaders agreed that the mechanism leading to the Six-Party talks could eventually develop into a multilateral security framework for the Northeast Asian region.

Roh’s dual-track strategy toward the U.S. is most clearly demonstrated by his commitment to the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (korus fta). The announcement of the beginning of korus fta negotiations in February 2006 came as a surprise to many, as few had expected Roh to initiate such a politically sensitive and divisive policy toward the end of his administration. The choice of the United States over China as the first major fta partner was also a clear indication that the Roh government still considers the U.S. to be South Korea’s most important partner. The korus fta is also of significance to the U.S., as South Korea will be the first Northeast Asian country to enter into an fta with the United States.

Liberal multilateralism isn’t working

Roh’s liberal multilateralism may sound reasonable in theory, but it has not worked out as planned. As North Korea’s missile and nuclear tests show, Roh Moo-hyun’s liberal policy has done little to change North Korean behavior. Nor has his multilateralism improved South Korea’s international relations. Seoul’s relations with Washington have also deteriorated to such a point that U.S. officials have openly hinted at the possibility of withdrawing American troops from the South. Relations with Tokyo have also worsened over historical issues and territorial disputes. Even China has not exactly been a close partner. In a move away from the common stand adopted by both China and South Korea, Beijing has employed tougher rhetoric and actions in response to the North Korean missile and nuclear tests. Beijing was also taken aback by Seoul’s decision to pursue a free trade agreement with the United States. In fact, it is hard to think of any country with which the Roh government has a good relationship. This has led to worries by analysts that South Korea has become increasingly isolated and marginalized in its international diplomacy over North Korea. 7

The main problem with Roh’s liberal multilateralism is that it requires him to carry out a perfect balancing act at all levels — between liberal nationalists and realist pro-Americans within Korea, between North Korea and the United States, and between China and the United States. The theory is untenable if Roh makes even the slightest mistake. And when mistakes occur, his carefully crafted policy of strategic compromise can result either in political opportunism or in policy inconsistency.

Another problem is that while Roh’s liberal multilateralist approach may be appropriate for dealing with Korea’s long-term strategic challenges, it does not address the immediate North Korea problem. In the short run, the United States is Seoul’s only partner in dealing with the North Korean threat. Although it is true that China, given its phenomenal growth, has compelled Seoul to find ways to deepen and expand relations with Beijing, the pressure from China so far has not been strong enough to expand the China-South Korean relationship to the military and security areas. Seoul does not yet have to avoid taking a clear stance that appears to favor either the United States or China.

Domestic support for Roh’s liberal multilateralism is also weakening. Instead of satisfying both the liberal nationalists and realist pro-Americans as he had intended, he has ended up alienating both groups. Liberal nationalists are unhappy with Roh for several reasons. First, they accuse him of having neglected inter-Korean relations. Second, they are upset with his concessions to the U.S. military on such issues as the relocation of U.S. bases. Finally, the korus fta is seen as a complete reversal of Roh’s Northeast Asian-centered foreign policy.

While realist pro-Americans support in principle Roh’s korus fta, they are deeply suspicious of his commitment to the agreement. Some even believe he would intentionally derail the fta negotiations at an opportune moment, so as to inflame anti-Americanism for his political advantage. The realist pro-Americans’ distrust of Roh certainly runs deep, and it is easy to see why. Roh waged an anti-American campaign for the 2002 presidential election that eventually swept him to power, and many believe that he has, by and large, continued with his anti-American stance during his presidency. And though he has offered a few concessions to Washington, realist pro-Americans feel that these gestures will hardly offset the damage inflicted on U.S.-Korean relations as a result of his North Korean policy. Realist pro-Americans also complain that the United States would not have asked for the relocation and expanded role of U.S. troops in Korea if the Roh government had been more cooperative on dealing with North Korea.

The moral high ground

If roh moo-hyun’s security policy has failed both to deliver a suitable level of security for South Korea and to win domestic popular support, South Koreans should rightfully turn to an alternative course of action after Roh steps down in February 2008. But what that course of action will be is still uncertain, as a lot depends on how South Korean conservatives position themselves. If the conservatives stick to their realist pro-American position, they will have little chance of making an impact on the country’s security options.

Under the current structure of policy discourse, with three competing ideologies — liberal nationalism, liberal multilateralism, and realist pro-Americanism — liberal multilateralism may be thought to be the most politically viable, with its centrist position between two “extremes.” Besides, in a winner-take-all plurality electoral system, political parties have, during presidential elections, been induced to move to the center, and this centrist approach is already gaining currency in Korean party politics ahead of the December presidential election. This can be seen in the issue of wartime command transfer, where the gnp has chosen not to attack the Roh government’s position because it is aware that opposing a nationalistic policy is politically dangerous.

Another reason for pessimism is that the current conservative realist pro-American thinking clearly fails to strike a chord with increasingly independent-minded and idealistic Korean voters. These voters want their government to offer a vision for national defense in which they can take pride. But not only has this proven elusive, it has also been undermined by realist pro-American arguments that effectively beseech them to depend on the United States for the country’s defense.

In this situation, the only alternative for South Korean conservatives is to return to a realist nationalist approach.8 Essentially, this means advocating a strong independent military capacity and a more equal U.S.-Korean alliance. Such a stance will make South Korea independently strong against the North, and provide Seoul with a new, more region-based U.S. alliance ready to take up the challenges of regional security. Seen in that light, realist nationalism will satisfy both South Korea’s short- and long-term security needs.

Of course realist nationalism will come at a price, but the economic cost will not be as formidable as it seems. The Roh government has already promised to spend an additional $621 billion over the next 15 years to achieve a state of self-reliant defense. During that entire period, South Korea’s defense burden will not exceed 3.0 percent of its gdp.9 Even if more money is needed for self-reliant defense, Seoul can still keep its defense spending below 4.0 percent of its gdp — or the same level of defense spending currently allocated by both the United States and China.

While there is no running away from allocating for defense expenditure, it should be pointed out that adopting the realist pro-American approach is not exactly cost-free, either. The economic price simply comes later. Realist pro-Americanism has created a pacifist culture among the Korean elites and public, but such an outlook is clearly unsustainable in the long run. Sooner or later, South Korea will have to make the tough choice between maintaining its security and sustaining its economic growth, especially when the North Korean threat recedes and the security priorities of the United States change.10 When that day comes, Seoul will have to assume the giant’s share of the country’s defense. Hence, to ameliorate the impact of an inflated defense expenditure in the near future, South Korean conservatives should take the lead in adopting the moral high ground on national defense. They should demand greater defense spending and a more equal U.S.-Korean alliance structure.

Of course, one may question the domestic political viability of realist nationalism. After all, realist nationalists have been losing ground in South Korean politics since the late 1980s. Besides, political elites who have entered politics since democratization began in 1987 have an almost natural aversion to realist nationalism, which they discredit as an outdated relic of authoritarianism. Realist nationalism’s cause has been further eroded since the end of the Cold War, which rendered North Korea politically isolated and economically marginalized. Consequently, a majority of South Koreans no longer views the North as a serious threat, and sees no reason why the country should boost its defense expenditures.

But one can counter that this decline in public support for realist nationalism is due precisely to a lack of imagination on the part of the South Korean conservatives. Instead of meeting the challenges of leftist nationalism head-on, they have taken the easy way out by opting for a free ride for the country’s defense. The conservative message to the public has been “our program costs less,” a message that hardly inspires confidence for the many assertive young voters who have grown up knowing only peace and prosperity.

Domestic political conditions may also be altered by changes in tactics, and one such may lie in the clear political advantage of the nationalistic component inherent to realist nationalism. Realist nationalists can assume the moral high ground by claiming sovereignty over North Korea and opposing any foreign intervention in North Korea that might threaten South Korea’s fundamental interests. Although realist nationalists support the U.S.-Korean military alliance in the prevailing security environment, they believe that South Korea should seek to strengthen its own independent defense capabilities in order either to increase the country’s leverage over the U.S. or to better prepare itself for a possible breakup of the alliance.

Realist nationalists are also idealistic, willing to make sacrifices to defend their country and stand up to North Korean leaders. Armed with such idealism and the willingness to pay for the country’s freedom, the conservatives can appear more credible and are able to strengthen their arguments in defense of universal values both in North Korea and within the region.

While they may come across as more nationalistic than realist pro-Americans, realist nationalists are practical enough to differentiate themselves from the liberal policy orientations of the Roh government. Hence, realist nationalism can be presented as a clear alternative to the liberalism of the past two administrations. After ten years of engagement that has failed to produce tangible results, realist nationalists can rightfully argue that it is time to adopt a new hard-line approach toward North Korea.

Realist nationalism will lead to better international relations for South Korea, as well. Since a realist nationalist government will not hesitate to assume primary responsibility for countering the North Korean threat, relations with Washington are likely to be improved. Realist nationalists will also be more open to increasing the strategic flexibility of American forces in Korea, as well as to bear a higher burden for keeping the troops in Korea. That is because they understand that while Seoul may be able to defend itself against Pyongyang, the country’s long-term security in the region cannot be achieved without the continued presence and flexibility of American troops.

As for China, Beijing will not be worse off under a realist nationalist South Korean government. The Roh government has aptly demonstrated that liberal multilateralists are not necessarily more pro-China than realist nationalists. Indeed, liberal nationalism may be more pro-China in propping up the North Korean regime than realist nationalism, but there is also the possibility that it may become anti-China if Beijing decides to modify its policy toward North Korea.

The realist nationalist moment

It is not without a tinge of irony that one notes that it took a leftist government to force the South Koreans to come to terms with their security problem. One way or another, South Korea must now grapple with the challenge of self-reliant defense.

How the South Korean conservatives deal with this challenge will determine the future of South Korean security in the decades ahead. If they choose to continue with their realist pro-Americanism, they are likely to be defeated by nationalistic offensives launched by the progressives. The consequences of this failure will be far-reaching, as it will plunge South Korea into continued insecurity and diplomatic isolation.

In searching for a winning ideology, South Korean conservatives should place principles at the forefront of their new campaign. They should understand that it is morally unsound to anchor their whole defense strategy on free riding on defense. Rather, they should revive their nationalism, which has historically been their moral foundation, and mount their own offensive by advocating even stronger self-reliant defense capabilities than their political opponents. They can further enhance their moral high ground by embracing human rights and democracy in North Korea and the Northeast Asian region.

The South Korean conservatives must be quick to seize on the realist nationalist momentum, since time may not be on their side. Before the campaign for the next presidential election begins in earnest, they must unite to present a coherent realist agenda to South Korean voters
1 Nicholas Eberstadt analyzed the importance of the 2002 presidential election in the context of the U.S.-Korean alliance. As he predicted, the alliance could not withstand the leftist shift of Korean politics. Nicholas Eberstadt, “Our Other Korean Problem,” National Interest 69 (Fall 2002).

2 For a comprehensive analysis of South Korean politics based on the left-right dichotomy, see Chaibong Hahm, “The Two South Koreas: A House Divided,” Washington Quarterly 28:3 (Summer 2005).

3 We can discern a variant of liberal pro-Americanism among some supporters of Roh Moo-hyun. Bae Ki-chan, who is a foreign policy advisor to Roh at the Blue House, argues that South Korea should enlist the United States as its partner for the reconciliation and reunification with the North. But he does not explain why the United States would go along with this South Korean design. Realistically, it is difficult to imagine that the United States will go out of its way to lead the engagement process that the South Korean liberals favor. Realist multilateralism is not realistic at the moment, since it would require strong security and military cooperation among South Korea, the United States, and China in tackling the North. Bae Ki-chan, Korea Standing Again on a Crossroads of Survival (Wisdom House, 2005).

4 South Korean geographical proximity to the North would always make Seoul more risk-averse than Washington in using coercion.

5 South Korean conservatives have long feared that Roh will turn to the summit meeting with Kim Jong-Il in an attempt to revive the chances of the ruling Uri party in the 2007 election. From this perspective, the pursuit of a second summit by Roh would be purely a domestic political act, not a change in his policy preferences.

6 Chung-in Moon, “Confidence-Building and Peace-Building in Asia,” paper presented at the East Asia Research Forum, Yonsei University, Seoul, Korea (September 23–25, 2005).

7 See Bruce Klingner, “South Korea’s Growing Isolation,” Asia Times (August 5, 2006). .

8 Realist nationalism was the dominant ideology of the South Korean government during the Cold War. Former president Park Chung Hee was a classic realist nationalist. Even under the structure of the U.S.-Korean security alliance, he worked assiduously to develop self-defense capabilities for his military. The fabled Heavy and Chemical Industries Drive of the 1970s, in which Korea’s current industries were initiated, was as much motivated by security imperatives as by economic ones, as it was felt that a strong heavy industry was necessary for an indigenous arms industry. When realist nationalists held power, South Korea kept up its defense spending.

9 Yong-sup Han, “Analyzing South Korea’s Defense Reform 2020,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 18 (2006).

10 Selig S. Harrison,. “South Korea-U.S. Alliance Under the Roh Government,” Policy Forum Online 2006, 06–28a, Nautilus Institute. See also Doug Bandow, “Seoul Searching: Ending the U.S.-Korean Alliance,” National Interest 81 (Fall 2005).

Jongryn Mo is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution.

Copyright © 2007 by the Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University